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NEW WORLDS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 
Patrick Dunleavy 
 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
Abstract: ‘Political science’ is a ‘vanguard’ field concerned with advancing generic 
knowledge of political processes, while a wider ‘political scholarship’ utilizing 
eclectic approaches has more modest or varied ambitions. Political science none the 
less necessarily depends upon and is epistemologically comparable with political 
scholarship. I deploy Boyer’s distinctions between discovery, integration, application 
and renewing the profession to show that these connections are close woven. Two sets 
of key challenges need to be tackled if contemporary political science is to develop 
positively. The first is to ditch the current unworkable and restrictive comparative 
politics approach, in favour of a genuinely global analysis framework. Instead of 
obsessively looking at data on nation states, we need to seek data completeness on the 
whole (multi-level) world we have. A second cluster of challenges involves looking 
far more deeply into political phenomena; reaping the benefits of ‘digital era’ 
developments; moving from sample methods to online census methods in 
organizational analysis; analysing massive transactional databases and real-time 
political processes (again, instead of depending on surveys); and devising new forms 
of ‘instrumentation’, informed by post-rational choice theoretical perspectives. 
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One does not set out in search of new lands without being 
willing to be alone on an empty sea. 
        Andre Gide  1 
 
 
 
The undeveloped state of political science has been a theme for depressed navel-
gazing in the profession over the last two decades. Our collective mood nowadays 
seems far removed from the confidence that attended the first lectures in Cambridge 
by Sir John Seeley (1896), the assertive pro-state position of early American political 
science in the hands of the younger Woodrow Wilson (see Dryzek et al, 1995), the 
enthusiasm of the post-war ‘behavioural revolution’ or the early hopes of the rational 
choice pioneers. In the UK’s ‘Political Studies’ or ‘Government’ departments (the 
continued British naming equivocation says it all) it is not hard to find people who 
agree heartily with Hal Abelson’s populist judgement: ‘Anything which uses science 
as part of its name isn't: political science, creation science, computer science’.2 
 Yet the mainspring of current pessimism is actually localized chiefly in three 
areas that should be manageable - the inescapable eclecticism of over-inclusive 
definitions of ‘political science’; the apparent ‘reset to zero’ character of theory 
disputes; and the problems of doing cumulative research in a fast-changing area of 
human behaviour. In Part 1 of the paper I seek to insulate forward thinking against 
these difficulties by defining an explicitly ‘vanguardist’ (that is, non-inclusive) idea of 
‘political science’, but one which none the less rests on a wider sub-structure of 
‘political scholarship’ Political scholarship still predominates in our discipline and its 
role is both essential and fully legitimate. But political science means something 
more.  
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In Parts 2 and 3 I briefly explore two ‘new worlds’ for a re-focused political 
science, whose tackling or neglect will define our discipline for the next half century. 
One is to begin to build a genuinely global political analysis that can for the first time 
capture political experiences across the whole world we have and treat them 
intelligently and equitably. To do so will require that we ‘break the mould’ of 
comparative politics, whose existing practice fetishizes the nation state as a unit of 
analysis and focuses single-mindedly on the same stale set of macro-institutional 
features, when we know that many different micro-institutions matter.  
The second set of challenges is to look more deeply and precisely at political 
behaviours than we have so far attempted. We need to radically modernise and 
upgrade our ambitions to collect evidence, our analysis of ‘fields’ of possibilities and 
our standards of proof and analysis. Key pointers to a better future include using non-
reactive web census methods, analysing transactional and events data, and embracing 
‘post rational choice’ theories and new methods. 
 
 
1. Political Science and Political Scholarship 
 
 
Science is built up with facts, as a house is with 
stones. But a collection of facts is no more a science 
than a heap of stones is a house.  
      Henri Poincaré 3 
 
A lot of learning can be a little thing. 
 Spike Milligan 4 
 
 
If our discipline means everything that gets done within departments labelled 
‘political science’ or ‘political studies’, its common purposes will seem elusive and its 
content eclectic. An APSR editorial pessimistically observed: 
‘Political science is a strange discipline. Indeed, it is hardly a discipline at 
all… [R]ather than being a distinct branch of learning, political science is a 
crazy quilt of borrowings from history, philosophy, law, sociology, 
psychology, economics, public administration, policy studies, area studies, 
international studies, civics, and a variety of other sources. Any real coherence 
in political science exists only at the broadest conceptual level…’. (Siegelman, 
2002, p. viii). 
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A second area of concern for pessimists is that political science (like the rest 
of the social sciences and humanities) will remain a ‘non-paradigm’ field in Kuhn’s 
terms, where intellectual disputes constantly threaten to ‘reset to zero’ established 
results by challenging their provenance, methods, empirical validity or theoretical 
premisses. Because of this ‘pull it up to examine the roots’ approach, political science 
will not become what Randall Collins (1994) famously called ‘High-Consensus, 
Rapid-Discovery Science’ as found in the physical sciences. Beginning around 1600 
onwards and moving at an accelerating pace over time all the STEM disciplines5 were 
distinguished by ‘high consensus on what counts as secure knowledge and rapid-
discovery of a train of new results’. A ‘law of small numbers’ in intellectual disputes 
still operates in these disciplines (see Collins, 1998), but only at the research frontier 
itself: 
‘It is the existence of the rapid discovery research front that makes consensus 
possible on old results. When scientists have confidence they have a reliable 
method of discovery, they are attracted by the greater payoff in moving to a 
new problem than in continuing to expound old positions. The research 
forefront upstages all older controversies in the struggle for attention. Because 
the field is moving rapidly, prestige goes to the group associated with a 
lineage of innovations, which carries the implicit promise of being able to 
produce still further discoveries in the future. Rapid discovery and consensus 
are part of the same complex; what makes something regarded as a discovery 
rather than as a phenomenon subject to multiple interpretations is that it soon 
passes into the realm of consensus, and that depends upon the social 
motivation to move onward to fresh phenomena’ (Collins, 1994, pp.160-1). 
 
By contrast, in fields without assured rapid discovery methods, not only is debate 
between alternative positions pervasive, but academic prestige can often best be built 
by debating or reinterpreting ‘fundamentals’, ‘the cannon’ or classic texts over (and 
over) again. In this light, political science certainly has recurring-but-moving-on 
debates – for instance, modern theories of the state have remained recognizably 
connected across two decades of modern debates (compare Dryzek and Dunleavy, 
2009 with Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). 
 The third source of current pessimism about political science concerns the 
continuous pressure of hard-to-predict changes in human behaviour and political life. 
Developments from ‘left field’ continuously catch observers unawares – ranging 
downwards in scale from the advanced industrial countries’ credit crunch and 
recession in 2008-10, through the 1989-91 collapse of the Soviet bloc, to the army 
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coup in Thailand in September 2006. Our inability to anticipate creates a huge 
demand for forms of study that simply document and update. Pervasive and 
continuous change allows ‘collecting’ tasks necessarily to absorb many energies of 
political scholars and it provides essential raw materials for any developed political 
science. An ‘über-current affairs’ can hence be alluring: ‘A cultivated person’s first 
duty is to be always prepared to rewrite the encyclopaedia’ (Eco, 1999, p. 21). Yet it 
also may conduce to the ‘pile of stones’ approach condemned by Poincaré, well 
captured in the distended ‘factbook’ character of most empirical textbooks, especially 
in the USA. Students would need the devotion and attention of a saint to distill from 
them the thinnest possible gruel of theoretical ideas or systematic knowledge of how 
political institutions and processes work – which must then be re-extracted again in 
any new sub-field. To make matters worse, the contemporary dethroning of all kinds 
of meta-narratives (whether liberal progress myths or Marxist dialectics) seems to 
have been widely interpreted as licensing an increasingly formless empiricism, even 
in the research literature.  
The increasing pace and detailing of the interaction between (especially) 
empiricist political studies and its subject matter also raises problems in an era of 24 
hour news, exhaustive media competition, and the growth of many ‘ideas aggregators’ 
(including think tanks, ‘public affairs’ specialists, consultancies, specialist media and 
many professions). Sifted for gold and mediated many times the collective applied 
interpretations of political scholars may also increasingly condition the routine 
behaviour of the parties, voters, bureaucracies and governments that they claim to 
simply describe - social science may increasingly create phenomena, as well as study 
them (Osborne and Rose, 1999). There is also a potential reverse process, where 
academic research priorities are reset, creating power-suffused discourses that can 
cripple basic research, and marginalize attention for non-conforming processes and 
phenomena that cannot be easily packaged as ‘information products’ (Gouldner, 1973, 
p.79). Yet there are also huge learning potentials in the effort to apply political 
science knowledge within the state or civil society. It is only within an atheoretical, 
empiricist version of political studies that the risks of cross-contamination of 
academic work are likely to become too high.  
 These problems - eclecticism, professional dissensus, slow discovery and 
constant social change – are undoubtedly important and difficult. But they do not 
seem decisive in damning the project of political science. Against the first three I want 
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to follow up a suggestion of the theologian Bernard Lonergan (1971, pp. 233-4), who 
wrote: 
I wish to propose a convention. Let the term, science, be reserved for 
knowledge that is contained in principles and laws and either is verified 
universally or else is revised. Let the term, scholarship, be employed to denote 
learning that consists in a commonsense grasp of the commonsense thought, 
speech, action of distant places and/or times. Men [or women] of letters, 
linguists, exegetes, historians generally would be named, not scientists, but 
scholars. 
 
To this we can add the explication of Boyer (1997), who distinguished four 
distinct but linked scholarships, of discovery, integration, application and what he 
termed ‘teaching’, but which I have relabelled here as ‘renewing the profession’ 
(because teaching aspects are strongly involved also in the other three strands). For 
Boyer academic discovery reflects ‘the commitment to knowledge for its own sake, to 
freedom of inquiry and to following, in a disciplined fashion, an investigation 
wherever it may lead’ (1997, p. 17). Discovery clearly encompasses the traditional 
concept of uncovering new scientific knowledge. But it can also involve many other 
forms of intellectual innovation, including the formulation of new theories, analyses 
and formulae, methods, philosophies, thematic ideas and memes, and the 
identification and analysis of unique events, linkages, narratives, interpretations and 
empirical understandings.  
By contrast, integration is concerned with the sorting, sifting, interpretation 
and understanding of what has been discovered, with the critical academic role of 
synthesizing, framing and fitting knowledge garnered by discovery and application 
into a workable framework or paradigm. For Boyer (1997, p. 18) integration is 
‘serious, disciplined work that seeks to interpret, draw together and bring new insight 
to bear on original research’. 
 Boyer’s ‘scholarship of application’ is concerned with the articulation of ideas 
and knowledge in ways that become useable for human purposes in myriads of 
different contexts. It raises questions like: ‘How can knowledge be responsibly 
applied to consequential problems? How can it be helpful to individuals as well as 
institutions?’ (Boyer 1997, p. 22). Much of the ‘rapid discovery’ ethos of the physical 
sciences has in fact been sustained not by a purist pursuit of ‘knowledge for its own 
sake’, but by the industrial and professional translation of knowledge into new 
technologies for controlling the physical environment, engineering responses to 
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challenges and managing medical problems. The lines from discovery to application 
have blurred and shortened, especially in new forms of industrial development and 
organization. Some quite similar processes have occurred in the social sciences and 
creative arts/design (CAD) disciplines, albeit involving much tinier levels of 
resources. Even in the humanities, applications have become important in fuelling 
new academic thought (e.g. think of the impact of genetic research on medical ethics 
and related law).  
The fourth type of scholarship involves renewing the profession via 
transmitting and passing on knowledge in carefully designed and accessible forms to 
students and external audiences. For Boyer this ‘is a dynamic endeavor involving all 
the analogies, metaphors, and images that build bridges between the teacher’s 
understanding and the student’s learning.  Pedagogical procedures must be carefully 
planned, continuously examined, and relate directly to the subject taught’ (1997, p 
24). 
This is a large landscape and there is no room for doubting that political 
scholarship (along with political science) is a legitimate and demanding area of 
specialization. A very large proportion of ‘discovery’ work in our discipline involves 
political scholarship, as does much of the integration involved in building narratives 
of the unique development of different political situations and settings. This possibly 
very specialist knowledge is what political scientists (and many others outside the 
discipline) rely on to make sense of our political world, to draw comparisons and form 
analogies. And it has important implications too for the scholarship of application, an 
aspect of political scholarship that has been developed in psephological, electoral and 
party analysis, and in some ‘advice’ areas of international relations and of public 
policy and public management.  
By contrast, political science as I have defined it (concerned with formulating 
law-like propositions and achieving universalizable forms of knowledge) is heavily 
involved in the scholarship of integration, although some forms of discovery (such as 
those concerning deductive reasoning, and the development and movements of non-
common sense indicators) are also important. This relative distance from discovery 
and some forms of understanding and application remains controversial with many 
political scholars, but it is by no means unique to political science. ‘The sciences do 
not try to explain’, said John von Neumann (1961, p. 495), ‘they hardly even try to 
interpret, they mainly make models’. Taking it one step further, Samuel Karlin (1983) 
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argued that: ‘The purpose of models is not to fit the data, but to sharpen the questions’ 
(quoted Buchanan, 2000, p.85).  
Yet the past concentration of political science on the scholarship of integration 
has undoubtedly been overdrawn in other areas, especially the neglect of applications. 
In political life application is potentially very important as a kind of ‘discovery 
learning’, in which stimuli or interventions are made to the political world and results 
are systematically tracked and traced out. Yet political scholarship remains largely 
‘postdictive’ not predictive: ‘Most numbers published in political science are dead on 
arrival: once printed, they are never used for anything. We can do better than that’ 
(Taagepera, 2007, p. 114). Of course, the relative importance of theoretically 
established consequences is always a matter for empirical determination and 
investigation, as demonstrated in Mackie (2003)’s detailed evaluation of the 
consequential insignificance of Rikerian cycles and Arrovian impossibility proof for 
the actually existing operations of liberal democracy. 
Looking more fundamentally, Lonergan argued rather controversially (in 
another work) that ‘Common sense is not concerned with the relations of things to one 
another.. [It] has no theoretical inclinations. It remains completely in the familiar 
world of things for us’ (1958, p.175). Since Lonergan’s definition above also links 
scholarship to ‘a commonsense grasp of commonsense thought’ this kind of 
characterization may make hackles rise. It may seem to characterize political 
scholarship as a second class form of knowledge, a set of pursuits that might not make 
it as front-rank outputs in the UK government’s new Research Excellence 
Framework. 
In fact there is no such implication here. Rather than link it to Lonergan’s 
‘common sense’, I see political scholarship as producing a high-end and specialist 
form of what Lindblom and Cohen (1979, p. 13) call ‘ordinary knowledge’, by which 
they mean knowledge that has not been formally validated or established through 
professional social inquiry. ‘Everyone has ordinary knowledge - has it, uses it, offers 
it. It is not, however, a homogenous commodity. Some ordinary knowledge, most 
people would say, is more reliable, more probably true, than other’.  In no sense am I 
arguing that ordinary knowledge (or indeed even common sense) in political 
scholarship is necessarily less complicated, less intensively or systematically 
acquired, or less difficult to process and organize than is political science knowledge. 
As Lindblom and Cohen put it the key need is to develop ‘useable knowledge’, and on 
 9 
these criteria the invaluable ordinary knowledge produced by political scholarship 
ranks highly. 
Lindblom and Cohen also stress that in understanding the social world the 
products of professional social inquiry (including a ‘vanguard’ political science as 
defined here) are at best scattered pinpricks of knowledge on a large canvass whose 
meaning must necessarily be constructed holistically. Thus political science outputs 
must necessarily be interpreted and given meaning (by all of us in academe as much 
as by policy-makers or administrators) within a massively larger fabric of ordinary 
knowledge, much of which involves complex and esoteric narratives and 
understandings that are constructed (and continually re-constructed) by political 
scholarship.  
Lastly I agree with the useable knowledge idea that political scholarship and 
political science also stand on level grounds in deeper philosophical and 
epistemological terms (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979). There is no special authority 
claim for professionally validated political science propositions, for several reasons. 
Not only can political science inherently never be comprehensive or self-contained, 
but in addition, its methods cannot claim special authenticity. As Paul Valery (1970) 
said: ‘“Science” means simply the aggregate of all the recipes that are always 
successful. All the rest is literature’. A political science seeking law-like propositions 
may well face more difficulties as a result of social changes, in ways that political 
scholarship’s more resilient and flexible narratives do not. Human beings always 
retain the reflexive capability to invalidate any ‘law’ governing their behaviour, 
especially when they become aware that such a ‘law’ exists. 
 The relatively slender fabric of modern political science thus stands alongside 
and depends upon the older and larger body of political scholarship, with which it 
almost necessarily remains on level-pegging in intellectual terms. The two forms of 
activity have different roles but an integral relationship. And given their joint under-
development, it is no surprise that political science at least still seems to easily meet 
the criterion suggested by Max Gluckman (1965, p. 60): ‘A science is any discipline 
in which a fool of this generation can go beyond the point reached by the genius of the 
last generation’. 
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2.  Creating a universe of data 
 
 
We have examined, as it were, a number of specimens, 
marked the most important differences, arranged them in 
classes according to these differences and given to each 
class a name.. Now this seems to me a most important and 
necessary part of any science of politics… 
          Sir John Seeley      6 
 
If there is a rule that no reflecting mind should ever forget, it 
is that comparison should be between comparable facts… 
Purely external analogies are not sufficient for building a 
positive science. 
          Jacques Novicow       7 
 
 
It is now more 31 years since William Anders’ famous Apollo 8 ‘earthrise’ picture 
revealed our planet as a galactic presence framed behind the alien landscape of the 
Moon, and (along with many other factors) began to change human consciousness of 
global phenomena in many dimensions. In political scholarship a wealth of mostly 
rather rhetorical books and papers have discussed ‘globalization’, often narrowly 
construed in international relations or international organization terms. But when we 
research the core topics of political science now – such as elections, parties, 
legislatures, executives, policy-making, public management, sub-national 
governments, public policy issues, and (yes) foreign policy and international relations 
- how far can we draw upon well-ordered data sets and literatures that bring together 
and marshal for us the cumulative fruits of political scholarship’s and political 
science’s activities across the whole world? What collective resources and academic 
endeavours can we point to that are globally scaled, designed and pursued without 
ethno-centric assumptions, and made widely available to the scholars and political 
scientists of all countries?8 What theories and methods have we developed for 
encompassing and analysing the whole of the data-universe on political processes in 
many diverse contexts that is out there and available to us? 
Simply framing these ‘how far’ questions is almost enough in itself to identify 
the only plausible answer as ‘Not much’. There are many small databases of 
information at the cross-nation state level assembled by particular scholarly research 
teams at different periods. They are often very variably and inconsistently bounded in 
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terms of time periods, countries covered, variables included, and analyses undertaken. 
Some of these stay current for a few years, but many lapse and are discarded after a 
short time, withering on the vine as their coverage is outclassed or their period of 
currency recedes into history. A very few international efforts exist to try and 
standardize data collection, in political or electoral surveys, for instance.9 But masses 
of objective data remain uncollated. Our inherently under-scaled analysis across 
countries almost never deploys any overall conception of global political analysis. 
Instead studies are framed within a ‘comparative politics’ (or even more restrictively, 
a comparative public policy) paradigm that emphasizes all the elements included in 
column I of Figure 1 below.  
 Defining what an alternative approach would look like is by no means easy. 
As Keynes (1936, p. vii) said: ‘The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in 
escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have 
been, into every corner of our minds’. However, column II shows a preliminary effort 
to sketch an alternative paradigm, which I have labelled as ‘global political analysis’. 
It is no more than a sketch at this stage, and I can cite no supportive sources that make 
the case for it directly, or indeed advocate anything much like it in the existing 
literature. Nevertheless, some of the methodological building blocks for this 
deliberately labelled ‘sketch’ are already available, and it is not simply a utopian 
design, but draws substance from many different pioneering studies that have 
explored this or that particular aspect. A critic might well argue that at this stage this 
is no more than a compendium of specific remedies for the problems with the 
comparativist paradigm identified in column I. But looking for alternative paradigms 
must always start with accumulating puzzles and problems of some kind.  
 Since I hope that Figure 1 is fairly self-explanatory, rather than work through 
it at more length when space is already short, I hope it may be useful to instead 
consider two more concrete cases of where standard comparativism is a contemporary 
dead-end, whatever its past achievements. Because there is no point in attacking straw 
 12 
Figure 1: The basic pre-suppositions and set up of comparative politics, contrasted with a preliminary specification of global political 
analysis 
 
 I: Comparative politics approach II: Sketch for a global political analysis approach 
1. Underlying 
substantive 
premises 
(a) Nation states are (and are likely to remain) core units 
of organization in all aspects of political life and public 
policy processes.  
(b) World-regional and international organizations and 
institutions are an important overlay upon nation states, 
but their internal operations also reflect strong nation 
state and domestic politics influences in mediated or 
specialized forms. 
(a) Nation states are one important level but not necessarily the 
dominant units of organizing political life. 
(b) Analyses at national level are often inappropriate for assessing 
key propositions in political science – e.g. Duverger’s Law cannot 
be assessed using national-level election data but only in district-
level analyses.  
2. Characteristic 
units of analysis 
(a) Nation states10 
(b) Almost always to the exclusion of any other units of 
analysis. 
 
(a) Aggregate national data on countries and sub-systems within 
countries, ideally world wide but in the interim covering many 
comparable countries 
(b) Disaggregated sub-national political contests and systems and 
government/policy systems across many (all) comparable 
countries 
(c) Both (a) and (b) are contoured and patterned into multi-level 
formations reflecting networks, influences flows, and the 
segmentation of sub-national areas or processes into discrete sub-
systems  
(d) Massed data on sub-national events and transactions of defined 
kinds, sharing a common meaning across many (all) countries 
(e) Massed data on individual events, transactions and responses, 
again defined and collected in common ways across many (all) 
countries 
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 I: Comparative politics approach II: Sketch for a global political analysis approach 
3. How units are 
weighted 
(a) In virtually all analyses each country counts for 1, and 
none for more than 1, despite gross differences in the 
size, salience and meaning of data points across 
countries. For example, in analyses of elections or public 
policy-making micro-states (such as Iceland, 
Luxembourg and Malta) count for 1 alongside small 
countries (such as Singapore and Ireland), large nation 
states like the UK or Germany, and country-world bloc 
units like the USA with 300 million people and India or 
China (with over a fifth of the world’s population each). 
(b) Analysis relies only on including ‘size’ variables in 
regressions (along with vectors of other nationally 
averaged country characteristics) to identify  influences 
arising from different country situations  
(c) For larger states there are no controls on the 
inescapable sublimation of discrete phenomena inherent 
in ‘averaging’ across electoral districts, sub-national 
policy systems or whatever, when using only national 
data. 
(a) In all analyses separate data points are entered in datasets from 
the outset to reflect all independent situations. For example, if we 
judge that India (with 1.1 billion people) includes (say) 400 
distinct sub-regional labour markets, then in an analysis of how 
labour market trends affect political mobilization we include 400 
distinct data entries for India, as against 1 for Malta or Iceland. 
Similarly in the USA there are (at least) 51 different prison 
systems (one for each state plus the federal system): so in an 
analysis of prison policy-making we need 51 different American 
data points, against 1 for Singapore or Luxembourg. 
(b) All analysis is conditioned from the outset by the need to cover 
different nation states or sub-national units that have the same 
substantive meanings or fundamental salience for the political or 
policy processes being analysed - defined by core comparabilities 
of population and economic activity, the discrete determination of 
outcomes or policies, or other objectively determinable criteria. 
(c) Data are never averaged into or compared across entities that 
are fundamentally non-comparable in terms of their substantive 
meanings, fundamental salience or role in global-scale systems. 
4. Intended scope 
of analysis 
(a) Varies from a handful of countries in qualitative work 
to larger numbers of countries (up to 70+) in quantitative 
analyses.  
(b) Country selections range from ad hoc justifications to 
the maximum number of data observations reliably 
collectable by a single research team, although often 
drawing on other sources for individual variables such as 
country scorings. 
 (a) The interim goal is always to marshall all available and  
substantially comparable data and information.  
(b) However, given the scale of these ambitions, sub-global 
networks or groupings of countries (such as the EU or APEC) may 
make a start by covering their own world-regions, within agreed 
global standards.. 
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 I: Comparative politics approach II: Sketch for a global political analysis approach 
5. Typical data set (a) Maybe contains 10,000 data points and covers 
perhaps 1,000 events or observation points, usually all at 
national level. 
(b) Many datasets comparing sub-national units of 
government or aggregate patterns of political behaviour 
exist for single-country studies (and some few-country 
studies). But they are usually framed well outside any 
‘comparativist’ perspective. 
(a) Contains from tens of thousands up to millions of data points. 
(b) Extensively covers the global or comparative analysis of data 
for sub-national governments or political activities organized at 
sub-national scale. 
6. Dominant 
methodological 
approaches 
(a) Quantitative analyses use ‘single best algorithm’ 
competitions, with only rudimentary segmentations of 
groups of cases in the complete data set – chiefly because 
of small N problems. ‘Root cause’ and multiple causation 
tracking analyses are elementary and rely on effects 
showing up in the single-best algorithm competitions 
(using inherently pre-averaged national data for larger 
units). 
(b) Qualitative work uses primarily literary case studies 
of small set of countries (2 to 6), often selected on near-
random or ad hoc criteria 
(a) Quantitative analysis uses diverse approaches, including 
heavily segmented analyses made possible by much large Ns, and 
hierarchical, multi-level regressions (Gelman, 2006; Gelman and 
Hill, 2007, Franzese, 2005).  Expanding the sample of units 
(contests, localities, regions, countries), ideally using the universe 
of units, means that the ‘context conditionality’ of current theories 
(their ‘scope conditions’) become much more important. Theories 
that have worked for EU or OECD countries, for instance, may not 
be more widely applicable. A key empirical implication for 
regression analysis is a need to use more multiplicative models 
(Kam and Franzese, 2007).  
(b) Qualitative comparative analysis (‘crisp set’) and fuzzy set 
approaches are key methods for systematically considering 
necessary and sufficient causes in qualitative analyses of multiple 
cases for which rich data are available (Ragin, 2000, 2003; 
Rihoux, 2006).  
 
7. Explicit or 
hidden 
methodological 
(a) Human societies are easily categorizable (explicit 
assumption) 
(b) Macro-institutions and macro-cultural factors 
(a) Human societies are just as complex to understand as physical 
phenomena, hence the most inclusive possible universe of data is 
always needed (explicit assumption) 
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assumptions or 
commitments 
determine all major differences between nation states 
(hidden premise) 
(c)  Useful null hypotheses can be defined using ad hoc 
or ‘ordinary knowledge’. In particular, differences across 
country contexts can be compared in ‘face value’ 
propositions (hidden premise). 
(b) Multiple causation is pervasive in social systems and operates 
on four integrated case levels (the individual, social groups, sub-
national communities and national society, see Sober and Wilson 
2000) as well as via single-variable level influences. 
……../continues overleaf 
 
 I: Comparative politics approach II: Sketch for a global political analysis approach 
7. Explicit or 
hidden 
methodological 
assumptions or 
commitments 
… / continued 
 (c) Micro-institutions and micro-cultural factors (including near-
one-off factors) may extensively condition the influence of macro-
institutions and macro-cultures, e.g. causing a general pattern of 
influence  to switch on or off, or even go into reverse, in particular 
contexts (explicit assumption) 
(d) Useful null hypotheses can only be constructed via prior 
theoretical analysis, in which apparently ‘common sense’ 
phenomena are separated into analytically comparable conditions 
(explicit assumption) 
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men, I have focused on two examples of scholarly work that asks excellent questions 
and uses innovative methods, close to the forefront of standard comparativism and 
looking across many countries.  
A. In their classic 1979 book Seats and Votes Rein Taagepera and Mathew 
Shugart sought to firm up Duverger’s Law (roughly that plurality/majority systems 
inherently tend to produce two party systems) and Duverger’s Hypothesis (roughly 
that proportional representation systems tend towards multi-partism). They showed a 
regression line based on the average national data from many countries’ elections that 
seemed to integrate the Law and the Hypothesis and to give it a particular empirical 
specification. Yet their analysis was already out of date in ignoring the point first 
made by Aaron Wildavsky (1959) that Duverger’s Law can only be tested using 
district-level data. And even in 1979 it was a little crude to use national election data 
only in a highly averaged form, generating single data points for countries’ ENP 
levels across whole periods – although this procedure has often used by other 
influential authors (e.g. Lijphart, 1999). 
 Taagepera’s 2006 book, Predicting Party Sizes pushes the research forefront a 
good deal further on. He notes that in every election (whether in a plurality rule or PR 
system) there is a ‘horse-race’ tendency for voters and the media to focus on the top 
two parties P1 and P2, generally boosting their support at the expense of the smaller 
third and subsequent parties (P3…PN). He then energetically sets out to determine 
empirically how strong this ‘suppressive’ effect is for the P3…PN parties, using data 
on 652 separately entered elections across 46 countries and sophisticated estimation 
method producing plausible-looking effects (Taagepera, 2006, Ch.8). 
 Yet the design has a fundamental problem, because of its unanalysed reliance 
on the comparativist procedures in Figure 1. In many of the 46 countries covered there 
are parties with strongly regional patterns of support, either because they are explicitly 
nationalist or regionalist in their ideology, or because their support is de facto limited 
to particular areas or ethnic groups. Thus in the UK the fourth largest party from the 
1970s through to the late 1990s was the Scottish National Party, which stands only in 
Scotland and hence has a maximum appeal of just 8 per cent of the UK’s voters. Yet 
Taagepera uses only UK data in estimating how far the SNP’s support was suppressed 
by voters’ focusing on the Tory/Labour horserace at Westminster – which inherently 
must mis-state this effect. And what is true for the SNP is also true for all other parties 
with regionally-limited support in the 46 country data set. By contrast if Taagepera 
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had instead used data at election district level, his estimation approach would have 
been entirely appropriate and a much larger dataset would also have greatly increased 
the accuracy of the estimated suppressive effects. 
 
B.  In The Economic Effects of Constitutions (2003) the political economists Torsten 
Persson and Guido Tabellini outclassed previous somewhat ad hoc comparative 
models by developing deductive economic models and tested (simplified versions of) 
them in methodologically sophisticated regression models on a large and rich (but 
essentially standard-form) country dataset (Acemoglu, 2005). They also found a 
dramatic effect for parliamentary systems to have significantly larger public budgets 
than presidential systems, after statistically controlling for many other influences. 
They ‘predict’ this effect by developing a highly simplified (‘toy’) model of the two 
systems whose essence is as follows. In all presidential systems a single chief 
executive must submit to at-large election. In pursuit of maximum votes she 
internalizes a public interest judgement and avoids beggar-my-neighbour 
distributional policies. By contrast in a parliamentary system with a stylized three 
districts, there are strong incentives for a majority coalition of representative from two 
districts to maximize their constituents’ welfare by redistributing resources from the 
constituents of the third (losing) district. Hence, the argument goes, parliamentary 
systems engage in more redistributive public spending. 
 The chief problem here is that the standard comparativist approach has all the 
problems identified above in column I of Figure 1, so that it is hard indeed to know 
what meaning to attribute to the single best algorithm outcome of the regression 
analysis, when the underlying data points cover entities of such substantive difference. 
More particularly, Persson and Tabellini clearly assume that the macro-institutional 
distinction between presidential and parliamentary system makes sense in terms of 
their deductive and empirical models. But does it? There are anomalous 
classifications (notably Switzerland’s highly collegial executive with an annually 
rotating PM is classed as ‘presidential’ because the PM cannot be removed by 
Parliament). There are very few cases of liberal democratic full presidential systems, 
and the usual problems of categorizing ‘semi-presidential’ but also parliamentary 
countries.  
More seriously it is easy to point to micro-institutional effects not covered in 
the country data that change the workings of the core ‘toy’ model in statistically 
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critical cases. For instance, in the UK a tiny and obscure component of the House of 
Commons standing orders says that ordinary MPs can only propose any legislative 
change that adds even an extra £1 of new public spending if they have a prior 
certificate agreeing the proposal from a minister, which is never given. From the UK 
this provision has made its way into the constitutions of all Westminster system 
countries, rather neatly negating the premiss of Persson and Tabellini’s parliamentary 
model for an important sub-class of such systems. If these countries indeed spend 
more than presidential ones (after multiple statistical controls), it is certainly not 
because of legislative log-rolling, which their set-up makes uniquely hard to achieve. 
Meanwhile in the USA the legislature actually dominates all the later stages of 
budget-setting and there is abundant evidence of pork-barrel and special interest 
attachments to budget bills (especially ‘earmarking’), many of which survive rushed 
last-minute scrutiny in Congress. Again because of micro-institutions, in a key 
presidential case (within only a small group of such countries) there is in fact the 
opposite of budgeting for at large elections. Instead, across all liberal democracies, the 
USA is the limiting case of legislative dominance leading to common pool resource 
problems, the polar opposite of Persson and Tabellini’s deductive model. The problem 
here is a lack of commensurability in the level of complexity between the deductive 
and empirical models and the phenomena to be explained. As Einstein once observed: 
‘Things should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler’ (quoted, Buchanan, 
2007, p. 113). 
 
 
3. Looking deeper (in the digital era) 
 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: ‘Why do people say that it was natural to think  
                                     that the sun went round the Earth, rather than  
                                     that the Earth turned on it axis?’   
Elizabeth Anscombe:  ‘I suppose, because it looked as if the sun  
                                     went round the earth’. 
Wittgenstein:                ‘Well, what would it have looked like if it 
                                     had looked as if the earth turned on its axis?’  11 
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The essential counterpart of enlarging the universe of data is to remodel political 
science and political scholarship so as to move out from an era of data poverty and 
analysis constraint, typified by the toy data sets and ‘falls at the first hurdle’ analysis 
of conventional comparative politics. We have all been socialized and educated on the 
methods appropriate to scanty evidence, and much of our training has emphasized 
data reduction to fit within the constraints of limiting methods and analysis 
technologies. Five specific shifts are needed, briefly explored below – becoming far 
more attentive to theoretically informed problems and associated null hypotheses; 
embracing digital-era data-gathering; moving from sample methods to census 
methods in analysing organizations; shifting from surveys to analysing transactional 
data in studying mass behaviour (ideally in real time); and developing new 
‘instrumentation’ informed by new-to-political-science theoretical perspectives.  
 
A. Theory-framing and close analysis. We need to look much more closely at taken-
for-granted political phenomena, recognizing that in the physical sciences advances 
have generally not come from grappling with ‘things as they are’. Instead scientific 
advances have often come from small, marginal-looking or apparently esoteric 
‘puzzles’ that only become apparent when common sense perceptions are abandoned 
for counter-intuitive ways of seeing. Thus it may seem obvious that the sun revolves 
around the earth; that feathers inherently fall to earth more slowly than lead weights; 
or that if I stand on a plain and drop a bullet from my hand it will reach the earth 
sooner than a bullet fired horizontally from a gun in my other hand - but none of these 
strong ‘appearances’ is correct (Wolpert, 1989. p.3). Yet core propositions in political 
science, such as Duverger’s Law, continue to be framed in common sense terms that 
cannot be precisely operationalized (as I show below). Hence they are amenable to 
multiple redefinitions and a continuously expanded insulation against falsification.12 
For political science the core of an effort to look deeper must be to produce 
theory and collect data in ways that continuously sets observation of what actually 
occurred in a given situation within a theoretical and empirical ‘field’ of what might 
have happened. The meaning of events can only be determined within an account that 
takes cognizance of other possible outcomes, using some knowledge of what 
would/might have happened anyway to track down the impacts of particular 
institutions, strategies or political interventions. ‘History is the science of things 
which are never repeated’, said Paul Valery.13 But being able to write some elements 
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of ‘counterfactual history’ and to tell what is or is not repeated (and at what level) is 
part of what makes political science far more than history. This may seem difficult to 
do, yet it is one of the main contributions made by (say) game theory applications to 
history. (For instance, Josep Colomer’s  (1995) account of the series of decisions 
underlying the Spanish transition to democracy demonstrates clearly the contribution 
that political science can make compared with conventional political scholarship). We 
need to show, as T.S. Elliot put it in Four Quartets (p.14), that:  
‘What might have been, and what has been 
  Point to one end, which is always present’. 
 
To give another apparently simple but actually rather fundamental example, 
we can only begin to assess the impact of an electoral system on how voters choose 
between parties if we know something of the preference structures of voters, and 
hence what they were trying to achieve with their vote, and what they might have 
done differently in other circumstances (Saari, 1995). Yet Mackie (2003, pp. 86-92) 
points out that it is in fact rather dubious that we have ever empirically recovered a 
complete set of preference orderings from any group of ‘real life’ (as opposed to 
hypothetical) voters. In the UK successive electoral surveys funded at public expense 
for a long period recovered only first preferences, a practice that opinion polls 
maintain even now – while academic elections surveys still do not go beyond poorly 
recording first and second preferences (Dunleavy, 2005).  Inherently circular concepts 
like ‘party identification’ also inhibited for decades at a time attempts to map voters’ 
comparative evaluations and perceptions of parties. As a result we have only 
fragmentary evidence of UK voters’ preference orderings, a pattern that Mackie finds 
replicated across many countries. 
 Pursuing this example a little further, how far can we construe election 
outcomes in terms of propositions like Duverger’s Law (DL)? A few analysts have 
abandoned the self-limiting comparativist obsession with national-level election data, 
and instead examined the evidence at the correct election district level. In a hugely 
noteworthy study Chhibber and Kolman (1998) compared plurality rule outcomes in 
India and the USA (later extended to cover the UK and Germany also). Yet in the 
course of the analysis their key test somehow gets coarsened into determining whether 
the effective number of parties is below 2.5 in a district (judged DL-consistent) or 
above it (judged DL-inconsistent) (Chhibber and Kolman, 2004, p. 48). For US 
Congressional elections though there are often only two candidates and very rarely 
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more than three candidates, making looking at ENPs only an exercise in book-keeping 
tautology. If only two candidates contest an election, the ENP must be below 2, since 
of 50 possible positive integer outcomes only one (50, 50) yields this result. If three 
candidates contest an election and all parties gain positive integer levels of support, 
there are 834 possible outcomes when we rank the parties P1, P2 and P3 in order of the 
size of their vote. Only one slot (34, 33, 33) can generate a perfect ENP score of 3, 
while 345 slots generate ENP scores of 2 or less. By failing to set the empirical 
outcomes recorded within any consideration of what could inherently occur in US 
Congressional contests, Chhibber and Kolman end up with no null hypothesis at all. 
In company with many previous researchers into Duverger’s Law, they have no way 
of separating out what is a substantive empirical outcome from what is necessarily 
bound to happen, given the initial structure of a candidate race (Dunleavy et al, 
2008a). 
 
B. Embracing the digital era. The research methods textbooks and most professional 
practice in political science and political scholarship have so far barely registered the 
contextual changes in information and analytic technologies now available as a result 
of social processes moving online. Some of the most consequential political thought 
of the modern era (by IT gurus and engineers) has also been ignored (see Brate, 
2002). Yet the cumulation of digital era changes has dramatic consequences, 
threatening to create our own ‘slow-boiled frog’ problem. 
In advanced industrial countries every salient political organization is now on 
the internet in some form, and their web sites, transactional systems, forums, blogs 
and other elements are largely open for inspection. Their websites at least (but not 
intranets) can also be systematically crawled for information, although this needs to 
be done slowly because anti-virus software will repel attempts to fast-crawl a site (see 
Escher et al, 2006; Petriceck et al, 2006). Sophisticated network techniques can then 
be used to analyse the ‘graph structure’ in the web data. Essentially how the 
organization communicates with citizen, businesses, civil society or other government 
or political bodies is fully open for analysis by political scientists.  
Of course, what the organization says online it is doing, and what the 
organization actually is doing may vary, and many political scholars have accordingly 
dismissed websites as sources of information, as simple public relations ‘fronts’ for 
organizations. There is a potential problem here, but in fact it is relatively easily 
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managed in most areas of political science, as Figure 2 shows. For online methods to 
work it is important that the vast bulk (say 95 per cent) of all organizational situations 
will be covered by the shaded cells 1 and 3, where an organizational is either doing a 
lot or a little, and its web presence (when critically assessed using online research 
approaches) accurately reveals that situation.  
 
Figure 2: Organizations underlying pattern of activities and their online 
presence 
 Organization is actually doing 
Organization represents 
itself online as doing 
 
A lot 
 
Not much 
 
A lot 
1. Web census analysis 
correctly identifies high 
activity situation 
 
2. Façade activity 
 
Not much 
 
4. Organizations with 
‘stealth’ activities 
3. Web census analysis 
correctly identifies low 
activity situation 
 
The two other possibilities would represent problems, if they are widespread 
and cannot be detected. ‘Façade’ activity online might mask underlying inactivity (or 
activity of a different kind) by the organization (cell 2). Yet this situation is actually 
much harder for an organization to sustain than might appear – because virtually all 
significant organizations’ web operations are now so salient, complex and interlocked 
with their fundamental transactions systems and ways of working. Essential business 
processes operate via the internet (not just press releases or creating a public relations 
gloss); web-sites are too expensive to maintain properly simply for propaganda 
purposes; and façade content is anyway clearly visible for researchers (see Figure 3 
below), and indeed any serious user.14 The whole concept of ‘digital-era governance’ 
stresses that increasingly government bureaucracies are becoming their websites, so 
that the organizational socio-technical system is increasingly manifest on the web. 
Indeed it has to be completely manifest or modern pared-down, system of risk-
adjusted administration will collapse (Dunleavy, et al, 2008b). Increasingly critical 
government-to-citizen and government-to-business processes are necessarily going to 
be online – for instance, in the UK for the first time a majority of self-assessment tax 
returns were submitted online in 2009. And everywhere in the advanced industrial 
world social security systems are following tax collection online (Dunleavy et al, 
2008c, 2009). The same degree of integral linkage between organizational form and 
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online processes has also developed amongst interest groups, charities and most civil 
society organizations.  
 Of course, there are organizations and places that are exceptions (for a time). 
Online processes have probably had least impact on political parties, because political 
leaderships are often been non-tech in their approach and the parties still maintain 
some degree of organizational separateness (i.e. opaqueness) as an (increasingly 
failing) incentive to membership. Yet even here, blogging makes intra-party linkages 
and opinion movements clearer and more traceable than ever before, internet fund-
raising has transformed political finance and internet presence has transformed 
leadership selection processes (Margetts, 2006). 
Nor is any of this to deny that some culturally-conservative political 
organizations (especially government bureaucracies) may lag well behind the digital-
era curve, in many cases quite dramatically. In 2008, for instance, the UK’s 
Department of Work and Pensions had 195 million customer contacts, of which less 
than half of one per cent were online contacts at this time. Put another way, it took the 
DWP’s 108,000 civil servants on average four months to process one email or online 
application (Dunleavy et al, 2009). Yet this conservatism and slowness of response is 
itself all perfectly trackable using online research methods. 
The last problem in Figure 2 concerns cell (4) covering organizations with 
large-scale ‘stealth’ activities, who are doing things politically or delivering public 
services, but not telling citizens or talking about it on the web. Yet who exactly are 
these bodies? Certainly this is irrational behaviour for any citizen-facing or business-
facing public service bureaucracy in an advanced industrial country, and for most 
interest groups, civil society organizations and parties also – to be implementing 
activities yet masking this from the public and society. Only a few special purpose 
agencies (such as intelligence services and defence agencies) and their opponents in 
terrorist organizations may actually have critically important classes of activity 
shielded from web revelation. Even police services and foreign affairs ministries must 
increasingly operate on the Internet, or risk being marginalized from society’s key 
information networks (Hood and Margetts, 2007; Escher et al, 2006). Similarly many 
modern terrorist movements rely extensively on online sites to raise funds, maintain 
broadcast communications, distribute ideological memes and provide for decentred 
patterns of cell organization (Burke, 2004, p. 39). 
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C. Moving from reactive sample methods to non-reactive web census and other online 
methods. Samples and sampling systems for social research were developed from the 
1940s and substantially refined by the 1970s. In our field they were chiefly designed 
to allow us to ‘read’ mass behaviour by looking only at the small amounts of research 
data that we could feasibly collect or analyse. Sampling theory and significance tests 
were key in this approach, to ensure that the sample was representative and random, 
and to guard against the potential for mistakes in inferring from the sample to the 
wider population. Sampling theory remains the basis for almost all our data analysis 
methods in quantitative research. Yet now digital era changes have undermined many 
of the assumptions that underlie our previous methodological thinking. 
A key way of analysing websites, again as yet completely uncovered in 
research methods textbooks, is to use web census methods (WCM), which now 
constitute a credible alternative to survey- or interview-based approaches in 
organizational research (see Figure 3). Non-reactive approaches can now create 
complete and rich organizational data about whole classes of organizations via desk 
research, reliably and quickly. And ‘fuzzy set’ methods can then tackle the analysis of 
genuinely complex multiple causation (Ragin, 2000, 2003). The combined results 
normally outclass both reactive sample surveys and in depth case studies. Why 
sample, when you can conduct a comprehensive census? Why worry about many 
aspects of conventional statistical significance, if you can include the whole 
population in your datasets from the outset (also avoiding all missing case problems)? 
Why base analysis on a handful of cases (left largely un-situated in the wider field of 
all similar organizations) when you can cover them all, in detail? This basic shift of 
approach can be easily varied and extended in numerous ways – for example, using 
external or internal search engines and specialist media tracker sites to track the foci 
of memes in macro-content through their incidence in discourses; crawling websites 
for in and out linkages (Escher et al, 2006); and using modern networking analysis to 
track influences (Fowler and Jean, 2008; Cho and Fowler, 2007; Christakis and 
Fowler, 2008). 
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Figure 3: Comparing surveys of organizations and web census methods (WCM) 
 Surveys of organizations Web census methods (WCM) 
Coverage A statistically representative 
sample, covering a fraction of 
the whole population of 
organizations. 
The whole population of 
organizations. 
Instrument 
defined by 
Researchers define a strictly 
limited number of questions. 
Question wording effects 
extensively condition subjects’ 
responses. Any incorrect or 
inappropriate single question 
wordings contaminate 
significant sections of analysis 
and results. 
Researchers identify a large 
number (several dozen to 
hundreds) of discrete items to be 
coded as present or not. Items are 
structured and weighted to tap 
theoretically relevant dimensions. 
Any single incorrect item has a 
tiny impact on overall indices. 
Type of 
methods 
approach 
Reactive methods (surveys, 
interviews) – those contacted 
may report erroneously, edit 
their responses or misrepresent 
situations. 
Non-reactive methods – items are 
coded as objectively present/ 
absent in the organizations’ 
websites, using simple 
dichotomies 
Researcher-
subject 
interactions 
Obtrusive – respondents know 
the study is under way and the 
precise content of its questions 
Unobtrusive – organizations need 
not be alerted that a study is under 
way 
Costs Substantial Low 
Key ‘meaning’ 
problems 
Responses may be artefacts of 
the questions asked. Responses 
are a poor guide to actual 
behaviour. The effects of 
interviewer and coder 
judgements may be hard to 
spot or control for.  
Organizational behaviours are 
established, but the salience and 
meaning of items coded may be 
disputed (at both an individual 
and an aggregate level). 
 
Key problems 
with 
interpreting the 
information 
gathered 
Who exactly in the 
organization completes and 
returns surveys varies a lot, 
and may not be known. The 
‘authority’ status of the actual 
respondents is typically 
unclear, along with how far 
they consulted others. 
1. Controlling for ‘façade’ activity 
– which shows up clearly in well-
designed coding frames. 
2. ‘Stealth’ activities that are not 
detectable on organizations’ 
websites. 
Key technical 
problems with 
datasets 
Small sample sizes. Extensive 
non-response. Extensive 
missing data problems in 
achieved responses. Mistakes 
cannot be post-corrected by 
researchers without going back 
to respondents 
Complete returns are always 
achieved, without missing data or 
non-response problems. Mistakes 
and mis-codings can be post-
corrected by researchers. 
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D. Tackling transactions and events data.  
Shifting social organization online has also created new datasets of mass transactions 
and events. In government, enormous transactions databases have also cumulated in 
social security, tax, immigration, health, educational and other bureaucracies 
(Dunleavy et al, 2008, Chs 6-8). More broadly:  
‘Digitization and the cheap storage of phenomenal amounts of data (constantly 
produced by cheaper processing power following Moore’s Law) have greatly 
changed the economics of analysing large volumes of information. Massive 
data warehousing operations have become central processes in sectors like the 
financial industry, stock markets, retailing, the travel industry, telephony, ISPs 
and increasingly digital commerce and burgeoning digital distribution 
networks for text, sound, and now video products. Companies have also 
created so-called ‘super-crunching’ methods for analyzing these huge volumes 
of data (Ayres, 2008)…. In the space of a few years, companies with pervasive 
information about their operations and markets have moved from the pages of 
science fiction towards actuality, with the growth of what Thrift (2005) calls 
‘knowing capitalism’ – a strong concentration of societal information in the 
hands of the most advanced businesses’ (LSE Public Policy Group, 2008, p. 
28). 
 
Weakly organized and highly siloed on discipline lines as we are, social 
scientists currently have very little access to these commercial or governmental 
transactional databases. Yet they are a critical source of far more detailed insights into 
social processes than we can muster– a development that has thrown some observers 
into near-despair. Savage and Burrows (2007 and 2009) predict ‘the coming crisis in 
empirical sociology’ when companies like Amazon, Google, Tesco or Boots in the 
UK, or in the USA Walmart, dispose of far more information about the cultural tastes, 
dietary behaviours and health conditions of the population than anything that 
academic sociology can assemble (Webber, 2009). They see a ‘danger [of sociology] 
taking refuge in the reassurance of our own internal world, our own assumed abilities 
to be more “sophisticated”, and thereby we chose to ignore the huge swathes of 
“social data” that now proliferate’ (2007, p. 887). The same syndrome applies also in 
political science.  
Again, mass surveys are likely to be a key casualty. Figure 4 compares the 
comparative efficacy of survey-based date-seeking about mass social behaviour with 
the insights offered by the analysis of transactional and events data that is now 
achievable in the digital era. The ability to study behaviour directly (instead of just 
inferred behaviours based on reactive responses) is a key advantage in column 2 here. 
 27 
In public policy and public management, transactions data show the same events 
sequences between citizens and government repeated numerous times, giving rise to 
very many but still finite patterns, and allowing us to segment interactions into 
multiple different categories and sub-categories. ‘The sample survey is not a tool that 
stands “outside history”. Its glory years, we contend, are in the past’ Savage and 
Burrows (2007, p. 890). (For related debates see Crompton, 2008: Stanley, 2008). 
So the challenge for all the social sciences is to act together (or fail apart) so as 
to secure access to government-held or corporate-held transactional databases, and to 
take forward the study of bureaucracy and governance in new ways. Unless we can 
succeed there will be a real threat of obsolescence to older and more conventional 
forms of political scholarship, of which some earlier signs can already be detected.15 
However, even while we must address these thorny problems of professional 
collective action, a vanguard political science (as I have sketched it here) can also 
make major advances in framing research questions in the digital era by defining 
innovative methods and achieving new applications.  
For example, the difficulty and time lags involved in accumulating over-time 
memberships or activity levels in interest groups mean that we have only isolated 
studies of their dynamics (see Hansen 1985, 1991). Yet now these dynamics more 
public and measurable on the internet. We also have the political equivalent of fruit 
flies in biology – short-lived collective mobilizations online, which allow us to study 
many iterations of different group dynamics. Thus Margetts and colleagues (2009) 
analysed the jump points when petitions on the 10 Downing Street website take off 
and reach critical mass or not, and the factors that are associated with them. Many 
repetitions of such real-time dynamics offers us a window into processes where 
previous research has generated few insights. 
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Figure 4: Comparing mass surveys and the analysis of transactional data 
 Surveys of mass behaviour Transactional data 
Coverage A statistically representative 
sample, covering a tiny fraction 
of the relevant population. 
All relevant transactions.  
Instrument 
defined by 
As in Figure 3. Question 
wordings with unambiguous 
single meanings are rarely or 
never achieved for heterogenous 
populations. 
Researchers monitor actual 
behaviours, but within limits fixed 
by the organization originally 
collecting data. 
Type of 
methods 
approach 
Reactive methods (surveys, 
focus groups, interviews) as in 
Figure 3 
Non-reactive methods – using data-
warehousing techniques  
Researcher-
subject 
interactions 
Obtrusive – as in Figure 3, but 
perhaps with less impact since 
samples are larger and some 
response biases may offset each 
other. 
Unobtrusive – the behaviours being 
covered are (mostly) unaffected by 
the researchers. But people knew 
that their transactions were being 
tracked by the original data-
gatherer. 
Limits on 
analysis 
Small sample sizes inherently 
limit analysis. Little hierarchical 
modelling. 
Analysis is feasible down to small 
area levels and hierarchical 
modelling is fully achievable. 
Costs Very substantial Low – large volumes of 
transactional data are already 
gathered by governments or 
corporations 
Timing Inherently episodic and usually 
cross-sectional. However, 
internet surveys are improving 
on previous long time lags. 
Real-time, with strong across period 
coverage. 
Key 
‘meaning’ 
problems 
Responses may be artefacts of 
the questions asked. Responses 
are a poor guide to actual 
behaviour. The effects of 
interviewer and coder 
judgements may be hard to spot 
or control for.  
Behaviours have real costs and 
benefits for subjects, so that 
‘revealed preferences’ can be 
extensively decoded by seeing what 
people do – especially where they 
have many real choices open to 
them.  
Key 
problems 
with 
interpreting 
information 
gathered 
Researchers often reconstruct 
complex respondent motivations 
from scanty data using post-hoc 
rationalizations. 
Key to ask: Is the behaviour 
required (e.g. a tax return) or 
voluntary (e.g. buying products in 
competitive markets)? Can subjects 
control how they transact? 
Key 
technical 
problems 
with 
datasets 
As in Figure 3, but more so.  Managing very large datasets.  
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E. New instrumentation informed by new theory. Specifying problems theoretically 
and placing a premium on close analysis are important because they hang together as 
a syndrome (just as much broad brush political scholarship ‘hangs together’ with 
common sense or ad hoc framings of problems – see Morton, 1999). The physical 
sciences made much of their early progress through the accurate classification and 
measurement of phenomena, the analysis of apparently small anomalies and ‘weak 
signals’, and the interaction of many different (‘swarms of’) methods, practices, and 
ways of seeing (Gribbin, 2003). Although most people think of Thomas Kuhn’s 
scientific paradigms approach as concerning only macro-scale, worldview changes, in 
fact he stressed that changes take place on many levels and often in small sub-sets or 
communities of researchers: ‘Paradigms are accepted examples of actual scientific 
practice – examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation 
together – providing models from which spring particular coherent traditions of 
scientific research’ (Kuhn, 1996, p.10). 
 Our basic data in political science remain widely inadequate partly because 
there is almost a disdain in the discipline for instrumentation or theory without 
immediate accompanying evidence of its utility in addressing problems at the 
common-sense level. The reaction against public choice theory’s heyday period of 
over-modelling and its close analogies to ‘autistic economics’ has been for 
contemporary journal editors to demand of any innovation an immediate empirical 
application. Some of the current malaise in political scholarship and political science 
reflects a hard-to-avoid scissors tackle. On the one hand, large areas of political 
scholarship appear to display a near-fatalistic methods complacency, especially on 
indices. The implied stance seems to be: ‘What’s wrong with a “bog standard” 
approach’? Consider, for instance, the effective number of parties: the index has some 
key and known deficiencies (Dunleavy and Bouceck, 2003) but it continues to be very 
widely used as almost the only index measure of party systems in comparative 
research. On the other hand, many scholars who think of themselves as being at the 
‘hard’ or ‘techno’ end of the discipline apparently believe that progress can be best 
achieved by a premature push for ‘normal science’ closure to new theories, methods 
and critiques. This is accompanied by a kind of misplaced ‘physics envy’ that stresses 
accuracy in the analysis of data that yet remain fundamentally flawed (as in newer 
political economy approaches to comparative politics). 
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 By contrast it seems to me that there are many areas of political science where 
new theories and associated new methods and analysis techniques are badly needed 
and where a wider range of fruitful, ‘post-rational choice’ building blocks are already 
in place, including agent-based models (Laver and Sergenti, no date; Laver and 
Schilperoord, 2007), network analysis (Cho and Fowler, 2007), biological models 
(Kremer and Olken, 2009), behavioural economics and more. Take, for instance, the 
analysis of collective action problems in the light of modern advances in theory. A 
long-standing strand in political science and scholarship discusses the ‘democratic 
myth’ that leads big majorities of ordinary voters in surveys to declare that their votes 
are important and that they personally can influence the results of large elections 
(Dunleavy and Margetts, 1995). Of course, as professionals we know better, whether 
we are teaching rational choice 101 or psephologically separating out marginal from 
safe seats. Individual voting may be normatively desirable and collectively influential, 
our professional consensus goes, but it is almost always individually negligible in its 
impacts. 
 Yet the classical models of probability on which such views depend are now 
somewhat under siege by newer approaches. Network analysis and ‘small worlds’ 
theories predict that individual voters have more extensive influence (Watts and 
Strogatz, 1998). And some empirical evidence supports the claim in US elections 
(Fowler, 2005). It is clearly much more complex to chart and assess influence flows 
than statistically calculating objective probabilities (or than just guessing at 1/N 
impacts). Suppose we have a grid of small and local influence flows, such as voters 
discussing politics with their nearest and dearest, plus a few work colleagues and pub 
friends. It might seem cripplingly unlikely that the micro-stimulus of one individual’s 
decisions or opinions could spread very far in such a ‘small worlds’ set-up. And so 
wherever we see a large-scale change conventional analysts are inclined to reach for 
macro-level stimuli (such as an initiative by parties or politicians or coverage by 
widely-seen media) as the cause. But in fact it may be perfectly feasible to achieve 
pervasive coverage or knowledge of particular micro-stimuli across a ‘small worlds’ 
electorate, so long as a minimum number of random (or near-random) links exist that 
are non-local and that communicate information between otherwise unconnected parts 
of the grid . Depending on the particular set-up of a situation, in simulations the 
density of non-local links needed can be very low while the system coverage achieved 
can be very high. In business the concept of ‘viral marketing’ exploits this 
 31 
phenomenon, and in the digital era the commercial viability of such approaches and 
the importance of tipping points are obvious to the mass readership of ‘pop science’ 
books (Watts, 2003; Gribbin, 2009; Buchanan, 2000).  
 Similarly the concept of ‘self-organized’ criticality argues that physical and 
natural systems may often exist in a condition where they are continuously on the 
edge of dramatic changes in response to small stimuli, even though most of the time 
small stimuli only have small effects. For instance, suppose we set up an experiment 
that randomly drops rice-grains across a surface to create a variably shaped pile of 
grains.16 The pile will get steeper until a slope is reached that is not sustainable and a 
slippage of grains will occur, most often only a small adjustment but occasionally a 
major landslide that radically reshapes the topography of the pile. The system will 
recurringly move back into the same condition of self-organized criticality in which it 
is not possible to anticipate or predict what kind or order of magnitude of slippage 
will occur next (Brunk, 2000 and 2001).  
Now just as rice grains will pile into slopes systems that are susceptible to big 
adjustments unpredictably, the same may often be true also of human social 
organization. In economics the implications may be that market models based around 
Gaussian distributions need to be radically rethought, and that major crises such as the 
credit crunch near-collapse of the world’s financial systems in autumn 2008 need to 
be re-factored into all our thinking (Mandelbrot and Taleb, 2006; Taleb, 2007). 
Statistical models better adjusted to ‘power law’ phenomena and ‘thick tail’ 
distributions may be far more applicable in social systems and political processes than 
we have thought.17  
Flip back to the collective action problem though and perhaps what voters 
espousing the ‘democratic myth’ have been telling us all these years in survey 
responses is that the electoral competition between parties (both in close-fought and in 
potential ‘landslide’ elections) is a finely poised system in a self-organized critical 
state, where any small input can potentially make a big difference. Indeed, many such 
cases may be happening on many different scales already, but being mutually offset or 
bounded in most cases. (How would we know, given the current quality of our data 
and methods?) So voters might need very low levels of influence in networks to make 
it individually worthwhile for them to vote, effectively taking out insurance against 
missing their chance to help forward a large change that they favour, or to bound or 
offset a big change from elsewhere that would be adverse to their interests. This is 
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especially true when we remember that at the group level those who systematically do 
not vote will almost certainly see state power wielded by others, perhaps often against 
their interests.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 A political science orientated to developing general laws and generic knowledge 
depends on and may well always rest upon a broader foundation of political 
scholarship that builds up ‘ordinary knowledge’ of ‘things for us’. Political science is 
an integrated body of thought concerned primarily with Boyer’s scholarship of 
integration, and to a lesser degree with his scholarships of discovery and application. 
That does not mean that political science can or should be a high consensus area on 
the physical science model – for as William Blake noted ‘without contraries, there is 
no progress’ (quoted, Paulin, 2007). However, a political science conceived in this 
way has a good chance of developing a rapidly moving knowledge frontier, even 
while political scholarship more broadly continues to absorb ever-changing political 
developments, to regenerate and innovate in the light of them, and to reinterpret the 
canon of conventional political thought. 
Two major areas of change seem to be needed. First, we need to ditch 
comparative politics as a time-limited conception – one that contentedly accepts a 
habitat of toy models analysing toy data sets with known and evident (‘Emperor’s 
new clothes’) defects, which cannot be corrected or compensated even by the most 
sophisticated statistical methods. We need to form a clear ambition to pull together 
and analyse political changes at the most inclusive (ideally global) level, creating 
large-scale data sets that escape from the prison of ‘nation state primacy’ assumptions, 
and can be analysed at highly disaggregated levels and as a product of multi-level 
causation flows.  
Allied with this must be a broadening and sharpening of political science to 
focus on problems that are deep-constituted by theory, framed in more carefully-
defined operational terms, situated within appropriate theoretical and empirical 
‘fields’ of possibilities, addressed with new instrumentation and open to being 
influenced by new-to-political-science theories. Transitioning into digital-era methods 
also means reducing our dependence on reactive methods, especially sample surveys, 
in favour of non-reactive methods, especially web-census methods in organizational 
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analysis and a focus on large transactional databases for studying mass behaviours 
and event processes. 
This is a big agenda to tackle and it will require concerted collective action 
amongst political scientists and scholars, and often across the social sciences 
disciplines, to accomplish.  But some key foundations for change are already in place. 
And with many established areas of our discipline already operating under the 
looming threat of intellectual or methodological obsolescence, the challenge to raise 
our game by innovating is unavoidable. 
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Endnotes 
 
* I am very grateful to Simon Bastow, Leandro Carrera, Keith Dowding, John 
Dryzek, Simon Hix, Vyacheslav Mikhaylov and Joachim Wehner for many helpful 
comments on the paper included here. I thank colleagues in LSE’s Political Science 
and Political Economy group and LSE Public Policy Group, our recent visitor 
Michael Laver, Helen Margetts and Tobias Escher, for many borrowings from their 
individual and collective wisdoms. 
 
1  Quoted in Minkin, 1997, p. iv. Minkin’s book has much to offer any serious 
political scientist. 
2   http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Hal_Abelson  Abelson is a well-known computer 
scientist at MIT.  
3  Henri Poincaré (1901), Ch. 9: ‘Hypotheses in Nature’. 
 
4    Miligan (2002), p. 294. This quote is the Envoi of a poem (called ‘England Home 
and Beauty for Sale’) about UCL architects putting up low-grade buildings in 
Bloomsbury. 
 
5    STEM means science (including medicine), technology, engineering and 
mathematics.  
 
6  Seeley, 1896, p. 361.  
 
7  Novicow (1910) quoted in Pichot (2009), p. 31. 
 
8  Ethno-centrism in political science is hard to combat, especially in the dominant US 
profession where an almost unchanging, single-country network of PhD institutions 
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dominates recruitment (Fowler et al, 2007) and a ‘science of American politics’ can 
still be taken seriously. Senior US figures still often talk and write unreflectively, as 
in: ‘The cold war’s end has been followed by an unprecedented wave of 
democratization and marketization, and the extension of American political, cultural, 
and economic practices around the globe’ (Schapiro and Deo, 2008, p.1, my italics).  
 
9    One of the best-organized and most successful co-operative groups creating 
disaggregated many-country datasets is the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES), on which see Vowles (2009). By contrast, the International Political Science 
Association, the American Political Science Association and the European 
Consortium of Political Research, and other powerful country-level political science 
associations in the UK, Japan and elsewhere have done nothing effective in this key 
area. 
 
10   Landman and Robinson (2009)’s Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics notes 
that:  
‘Today comparativists engage in the quantitative comparison of many 
countries, qualitative and quantitative comparison of few countries and 
quantitative analysis conducted in single countries. These comparisons 
typically use the nation state and annual observation as the basic unit of 
analysis…’ (p.3).  
Google Books’ analysis of this text shows that across its 509 pages (at least 350,000 
words), the many authors here mention ‘local’ anything 37 times, ‘sub-national’ 
anything 10 times, and ‘multi-level’ anything just three times.  
  
11     Anscombe, 1959, p. 52. I have put her account of the conversation into a 
dialogue form here and omitted the commentary on both participants’ non-verbal 
behaviour. I am very grateful to Keith Dowding for drawing this quotation to my 
attention. 
 
12   Looking across modern physics and chemistry journals Colomer (2007, p. 134) 
highlights three parallel lessons for political science: ‘Variables should be well 
defined and measurable; the relationships between variables may be non-linear; the 
direction of causality should be clearly identified and not assumed on a priori 
grounds’. 
 
13   Paul Valery, Variété IV, quoted in (Buchanan, 2000), p. 1. 
14    Suppose, for instance, that a city local government wants to represent itself as 
having a joined-up approach to services for the elderly, when in fact its provision 
remains resolutely siloed, limited and under-funded. It can certainly draft up some 
nice pages of plausible pictures and high-sounding goals, but it cannot then back up 
this misleading gloss with all the necessary in-depth website provision needed, nor 
keep it up to date. If in fact the city has only weak links (or no links) with local health 
services, the social security department or the housing and transport sections, this will 
quickly become apparent to anyone trying to secure some help for themselves or an 
aged relative. Contradictions and loose connections that may not be obvious to a 
causal website visitor, clicking through in two or three minutes, are immediately 
visible on closer inspection – especially by a trained researcher spending an hour on 
the website. Figure 3 also shows how the actual integration of services can be mapped 
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by evaluating and coding dozens of objective indicators. 
 
15   Cohen (2009) explains a legislative move by an Oklahoma senator to ban US 
political science from receiving National Science Foundation grants. 
 
16   Per Bak (1997) famously argued in terms of a theoretically-specified hypothetical 
and pile. But empirically it turns out that sand piles are more Gaussian and do not in 
fact develop self-organized criticality - whereas rice piles do. 
 
17  Some early applications have been made in political science, such as Baumgarter 
and Jones (2009); and John and Margetts, (2003). 
